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Abstract 
In the commercial aviation domain, large volumes of data are 
collected and analyzed on the failures and errors that result in infrequent 
incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that 
contribute to routine successful outcomes, safety management and 
system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-
representative safety data. Analysis of aviation accident data suggests 
that human error is implicated in up to 80% of accidents, which has been 
used to justify future visions for aviation in which the roles of human 
operators are greatly diminished or eliminated in the interest of creating 
a safer aviation system. However, failure to fully consider the human 
contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation 
represents a significant and largely unrecognized risk when making 
policy decisions about human roles and responsibilities. Opportunities 
exist to leverage the vast amount of data that has already been collected, 
or could be easily obtained, to increase our understanding of human 
contributions to “things going right” in commercial aviation. The 
principal focus of this assessment was to identify current gaps and 
explore methods for identifying human “success” data generated by the 
aviation system, from personnel and within the supporting infrastructure. 
1.0 Executive Summary 
Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform 
countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These 
judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, 
data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. 
Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited 
by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify 
solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent 
incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful 
outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-
representative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made 
possible by human operators. 
With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing 
on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully 
consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a 
significant risk—a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans 
contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete 
and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to 
safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and 
the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized 
human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. 
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Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or 
recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained 
by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An 
alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that 
process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little 
information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel [Ref. 1] 
has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their 
operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to 
grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that 
go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires 
developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor 
everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs 
function in reality. 
This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of 
resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel [Ref. 2], a system is resilient if it can sustain 
required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior 
to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” 
behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team 
examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower 
controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective 
aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient 
performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed 
methods for capturing and analyzing new data. 
The findings and observations presented in Section 4.0 can be summarized as: 
 NASA and industry planning and system design in aviation are based on principles and 
methods focused on predicting and preventing errors. 
 Current safety reporting processes are designed to focus on and capture events that 
degrade safety, but not positive events that bolster safety. 
o Operators identified cultural barriers to reporting positive behaviors, because 
adapting to routine disturbances was seen as expected job performance. 
o Existing observer-, operator-, and system-based approaches to data collection and 
analysis do not systematically include operators’ resilient behaviors. 
o Many of the identified behaviors associated with operators’ ability to anticipate, 
monitor, and respond require leveraging experience-based information. No 
methods currently exist, however, to systematically report or capture this 
information. 
o Existing operator behavior taxonomies conflate “positive” operator behaviors 
with “positive” operational outcomes and “negative” operator behaviors with 
“negative” operational outcomes. 
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 Defining safety in terms of “things that go right” enabled new methods for exploring 
existing data. 
o Operators were able to reflect on and provide specific examples of resilient 
behaviors. 
o Evidence of the use of operator strategies that promote resilient performance were 
identified in objective data. 
 Subjective and objective data sources contributed different information toward building 
an understanding of operators’ resilient performance. 
o Current approaches for safety data collection and analysis are not designed to 
integrate data from disparate sources. 
o Subjective data sources are necessary to understand the rationale for actions 
identified in objective data. 
These findings resulted in eight NESC recommendations for NASA ARMD’s Transformative 
Aeronautics Concepts Program and Airspace Operations and Safety Program: 
 Define safety in terms of the presence of desired behaviors and the absence of undesired 
behaviors. 
 Leverage existing data to identify strategies and behaviors that build resource margins 
and prevent them from degrading. 
 Develop organization-level strategies that promote recognition and reporting of behaviors 
that support resilient performance. 
 Develop expert-observer-based data collection tools to capture strategies and behaviors 
that support resilient performance. 
 Develop methods to collect and analyze operator-reported strategies and behaviors that 
support resilient performance. 
 Develop approaches to expand collection and facilitate analysis of resilient behaviors in 
adverse event reports. 
 Refine data analytics approaches for exploiting Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
(FOQA) data based on identified resilience strategies. 
 Develop a system-level framework for collecting and analyzing resilient performance 
data that is explicitly designed to integrate information from observer-, operator-, and 
system-based data sources. 
To improve safety, system designers should understand what humans do well and create systems 
with this understanding in mind. System designers and safety managers should look at what goes 
right as well as what goes wrong, and learn from what succeeds as well as from what fails. 
Things do not go well because people follow rules and procedures. Rather, things go well 
because people exhibit performance variability and make sensible adjustments and adaptations in 
response to interpretation of what is happening and the demands of the situation. Through 
understanding “how” and “why” people perform work, in addition to understanding “what,” 
“where,” and “when,” systems can be designed to ensure the ultra-safe airspace system is not 
unintentionally made less safe due to loss of resilient properties that are provided by human 
operators and are not well-understood. 
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Although the civil aviation system includes humans in many roles, the assessment team focused 
on commercial air transport operations, specifically on the roles of pilots and ATC tower 
controllers. The particular focus was on behavior of individual operators rather than that of teams 
or organizations. Furthermore, analysis was limited to datasets that were rapidly obtainable and 
already familiar to the team, given the time constraints of the assessment. 
2.0 Problem Description, Background, and Scope 
2.1 Problem Description 
In World War II, Allied aircraft were key to the war effort, yet they were constantly at risk of 
being shot down over enemy territory. The planes needed more armor, but due to weight 
restrictions, armor plating could be applied only where necessary. The team tasked with 
identifying the critical locations for armor plating plotted the pattern of bullet holes on returning 
aircraft. The initial assumption was that the locations of these clusters were the spots that needed 
more armor. 
However, Abraham Wald, who was brought in to oversee the operation, reasoned that the 
military did not need to reinforce the spots that had bullet holes. Rather, they needed to reinforce 
the spots that did not have bullet holes. Planes that had been shot in the bullet-free zones never 
made it home to be accounted for in the diagrams. For Wald, the revelation was that the bullet-
hole data from returning aircraft were not random, but an indication that those bullet-free zones 
were the most vital [Ref. 3].  
Wald’s insight has important implications for current-day civil aviation safety: System designers 
and safety managers should identify those technical, functional, and procedural domains that do 
not have bullet holes — success areas that have not been hit and for which no failure maps  
(i.e., bullet-hole patterns) exist. When segments of a target population — in this case, successful, 
safe flights — are not systematically analyzed, they are under-represented in the conclusions. In 
this situation, critical factors causing commercial aviation to display the characteristics of an 
ultra-safe, socio-technical system are not identified, measured, or analyzed. This report offers 
methods for discovering and analyzing the missing “success data” in civil aviation. 
Successful decisions during routine operations require dealing with phenomena like weather, 
system problems, gate/runway unavailability, unanticipated autopilot behavior, and many other 
dynamic, unplanned, or unanticipated events. According to the report of the Performance-based 
operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee/Commercial Aviation Safety Team (PARC/CAST) 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group [Ref. 4], 20% of flights experience aircraft 
malfunctions requiring flight crew intervention. Recovery from these malfunctions occurs 
seamlessly in most cases. In addition, favorable management and organizational environments 
(e.g., training) support the actions of operational personnel in dealing with these in-flight 
malfunctions. These recovery actions by human operators are evidence of “graceful degradation” 
from nominal technology and procedural functions and organizational processes.  
NASA ARMD’s Strategic Implementation Plan proposes that machines take on tasks and 
responsibilities currently performed by humans [Ref. 5]. One of the future aviation concepts in 
NASA ARMD’s research portfolio is Urban Air Mobility (UAM). The UAM concept describes a 
safe and efficient system for vehicles, piloted or not, to move passengers and cargo within a city 
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environment. While private companies are starting to develop the infrastructure to make UAM a 
reality, NASA’s role in UAM is to establish feasibility and help set the requirements to enable 
the UAM vision [Ref. 6]. NASA has signed a Space Act Agreement with Uber Technologies, 
Inc. (Uber), to explore UAM concepts and technologies as well as identify and address the 
challenges facing the UAM market [Ref. 7].  
As a part of its vision for the future of on-demand urban air transportation, Uber identified that 
safety is paramount to establishing market acceptance [Ref. 8]. Uber asserted that safety can be 
measured on a number of negative dimensions, including injuries, accidents, and fatalities, and 
that the path to improving safety requires understanding the root causes of historical crashes. 
Uber further highlighted that pilot error represents a leading cause of fatalities, and concluded 
that “to fast-forward to the safest possible operational state for vertical takeoff and landing 
vehicles, network operators will be interested in the path that realizes full autonomy as quickly as 
possible.” This assertion that full autonomy represents the safest possible operation state 
presupposes that human operators make operations less safe. However, neither Uber’s vision for 
UAM nor NASA’s planned activities to enable this vision consider the everyday operational 
practices of human operators that contribute to system safety. Without understanding how 
humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is 
incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, this understanding provides the necessary basis 
for designing machine systems that could perform safety-producing behaviors. 
ARMD’s Strategic Implementation Plan proposes development of in-time safety monitoring, 
prediction, and mitigation technologies. Ironically, a critical barrier to measuring safety threats 
and the impact of mitigation strategies in ultra-safe systems like commercial aviation is the lack 
of opportunities for measurement. Although it is common practice to relate safety to how many 
accidents or fatalities occur for a given volume of traffic, very safe systems have very few 
accidents. Therefore, accident data cannot be readily used to validate safety improvements for at 
least two reasons. First, the time necessary to observe the effect of a given safety intervention in 
accident statistics becomes excessively long, with estimates up to 6 years for a system with a 
fatal accident rate per operation of 10-7 [Ref. 9]. Second, attributing improvement to a specific 
intervention becomes intractable due to the many thousands of changes that a complex 
sociotechnical system would experience over that time period [Ref. 10]. While ARMD’s 
strategic roadmap for Real-Time System-Wide Safety indicates a need to develop models and 
metrics to characterize safe operations, the research roadmap and technical challenge 
descriptions that define the research plans for ARMD’s System-Wide Safety Project consistently 
characterize safety with regard to identifying and avoiding risks. Defining safety in terms of 
eliminating or minimizing factors that create risk leads at best to an incomplete picture of safety. 
First, this approach leverages “known” risks identified through analysis of accident or incident 
data, and therefore does not encompass all risk. Second, this approach does not consider factors 
that create safety successes. This is particularly relevant for very safe systems, in which safety 
successes dramatically outnumber safety failures. 
Decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems should be, and very 
frequently are, based on data. However, data-driven decisions are limited by what data have been 
collected and analyzed. In current-day civil aviation, large volumes of data are collected on the 
failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but data on behaviors that 
result in routine successful outcomes are rarely collected or analyzed. Thus, data-driven safety 
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management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of non-representative 
safety data. The data that are available bias how decision makers characterize problems and 
identify solutions. 
The goal of this NESC assessment was to develop methodologies for identifying the beneficial 
roles humans and organizations play in the aviation system as a complement to human error 
detection and mitigation. This assessment aimed to identify tools, methods, and data collection 
mechanisms for finding “success” data generated by the aviation system, from personnel and 
within the supporting infrastructure. The assessment addressed the following questions: 
a) What can be learned about human contributions to safety success from existing data 
sources? 
b) Where are the gaps in data collection and analysis? 
c) What are the opportunities for collecting success data in the future? 
The answers to these questions could give ARMD and the aviation safety community powerful 
insights into what is working and why, and provide guidance on where to target safety resources.  
This assessment builds upon a growing resilience engineering literature and new approaches to 
safety. However, the question remains largely open of how to translate the principles, values and 
concepts described in the literature into specific instruments and tools for specific organizations 
or work domains [Ref. 11]. 
2.2 Background 
The NAS is a highly complex sociotechnical system that continues to grow and change at an 
increasing pace. The ever-increasing demand for flights has led to increasingly crowded airspace, 
an accompanying need for more personnel, and more extensive use of automation. Despite the 
many changes and advances in commercial aviation, safety thinking, practices, and models have 
not kept pace. Thus, many of the same simple cause-and-effect relations and linear models used 
to explain accidents and incidents since at least the 1930s remain in widespread use [Ref. 12]. 
Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or 
recognized risks (i.e., safety is typically defined in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse 
outcomes are, in turn, explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating 
or mitigating these causes. As new accidents occur, they are explained by new causes, typically 
relating to technology, human factors, or organizational factors. 
The ubiquity of this approach is apparent in regulations requiring detailed reporting of accidents 
and incidents; organizations and groups dedicated to analyzing these events; databases of 
incidents and accidents; and numerous models and taxonomies of things that go wrong and their 
causes. However, for ultra-safe systems like commercial air transport, this effort focuses on a 
very small proportion of events (i.e., the probability of being in a fatal accident on a commercial 
jet passenger flight is 2.0 x 10-7 [Ref. 13]). Thus, for every well-scrutinized accident, millions of 
flights in which things go right receive very little attention. 
Hollnagel refers to this common understanding of safety, which focuses on reducing adverse 
outcomes, as Safety I [Ref. 1]. Safety I describes a bimodal view of system performance, in 
which things go right because the system is functioning as it should, and things go wrong when 
something in the system has malfunctioned or failed. The goal of safety management is to ensure 
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that the system stays in the first mode and avoids the second. Thus, safety is defined in terms of 
what happens when it is absent rather than when it is present. A consequence of this definition is 
that perfect safety is defined by having no adverse outcomes, and therefore nothing to measure. 
Thus, for a time period in which no adverse outcomes occur, it becomes impossible to 
demonstrate the efficacy of efforts to improve safety. Furthermore, predictions of the future 
safety state of a system are dependent on known risks and are insensitive to uncertain, 
unanticipated, and unpredicted risks. 
Safety I thinking is predicated on the belief that adverse outcomes occur because something has 
gone wrong, therefore adverse outcomes have causes that can be identified and treated. Because 
a system can be constructed, it is assumed that this process can be reversed, and systems can be 
decomposed into meaningful constituents. Furthermore, it is assumed that if this can be 
accomplished for technological systems, it can be done for tasks and events.  
While this approach may be successful for comprehensively defined, highly constrained systems, 
these assumptions are inappropriate for complex sociotechnical systems (e.g., today’s 
commercial air transport system). With the continuous introduction of increasingly complex and 
capable technologies comes a commensurate demand for increased operational capacity, 
intensity, and tempo (i.e., the Law of Stretched Systems [Ref. 14]). This demand results in a 
system in which functions and services become more tightly coupled, making it increasingly 
harder to isolate and address individual constituents. Furthermore, increasing system complexity 
and rate of change means that systems are likely to evolve before they can be fully described. 
The resulting system has limited predictability and operates in ways that cannot be precisely 
prescribed in design or operation. Therefore, Safety I thinking is an insufficient basis for safety 
management. 
A further consequence for complex technologies designed using Safety I thinking is that the 
operator must fill in the gaps for those aspects of performance that were not identified or 
considered during design. As systems become more complex, the number of unanticipated 
operating states increases. The resulting regular compensation by the operator for system design 
flaws comes at a cost of increased workload, performance pressures, and vulnerability to 
unpredicted outcomes [Ref. 15]. Furthermore, the Safety I focus on failure gives the impression 
that the human performance variability that results from inadequate design is a major hazard, 
puts the blame on the operator, and does little to uncover the details of successes and 
opportunities created by human adaptations [Ref. 16]. 
Safety I thinking asserts that nominal working conditions can be completely analyzed and 
prescribed (i.e., “work-as-imagined”). On the other hand, “work-as-done” describes how work 
actually unfolds over time [Ref. 17]. Thus, an assumption of Safety I thinking is that safety can 
be achieved by ensuring that work-as-done corresponds to work-as-imagined. In complex 
environments, work practices (i.e., work-as-done) can differ significantly from the procedures 
and policies that define work-as-imagined. This is often acknowledged in complex systems by 
giving operators the latitude to deviate from procedures when, in their judgment, it is in the 
safety interest of the operation. For example, Federal Aviation Regulations state: “In an in-flight 
emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this 
part to the extent required to meet that emergency” [Ref. 18]. However, this also leads to the 
unavoidable conclusion that safety models predicated on equating work-as-done with work-as-
imagined are, at best, inadequate. 
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An alternative approach to Safety I is to focus on what goes right, and identify how to replicate 
this process. This approach is identified by Hollnagel [Ref. 1] as Safety II. Focusing on the rare 
cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human 
performance almost always goes right. Similarly, focusing on the lack of safety provides little 
information about how to improve safety. Safety II thinking is predicated on the concept that 
things go right, in part, because people continuously adjust their work practices to match their 
operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to 
grow in complexity. Hollnagel proposed that the definition of safety should reflect not only 
“avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” Thus, the basis for safety 
management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. 
It can be argued that if something already works, why spend more time on it? However, in 
complex systems, things often do not work in the ways they are intended or assumed to work. In 
addition, in dynamic, evolving environments, it cannot be assumed that routines that work today 
will continue to work in the future. The discrepancy that can exist between work-as-imagined 
and work-as-done was illustrated in a civil aviation context by Stewart, Matthews, Janakiraman, 
and Avrekh [Ref. 19]. Area navigation standard terminal arrival route (RNAV STAR) 
procedures used at major airports are intended to increase predictability and efficiency. These 
procedures provide vertical, lateral, and speed profiles for aircraft to follow as they descend 
toward an airport. Analyzing aircraft flight track data for more than 10 million flights into 32 
domestic airports revealed that only 12.4% of flights fully complied with the vertical and lateral 
profiles in the RNAV STARs (i.e., vertical compliance within 300 feet above or below a 
waypoint altitude restriction, and lateral compliance within one mile left or right of the route 
centerline). While the Stewart, et al., study provides an example in which published procedures 
(i.e., work-as-imagined) were misaligned with normal operations (i.e., work-as-done), questions 
remain with regard to the reasons for the misalignment, and thus how to interpret this finding. 
For example, these procedural non-adherences may represent necessary adaptations to achieve 
operational goals in specific contexts (e.g., avoiding encounters with convective weather). One 
of the foundations of Safety II is that performance is always variable, and the ability to make 
performance adjustments is an essential human contribution to work. Monitoring everyday work 
can help to efficiently and proactively identify new strategies that work and conditions under 
which existing strategies break down. Few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the 
aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. 
It should be noted that Safety I and Safety II represent two complementary views of safety rather 
than incompatible or conflicting approaches. The primary characteristics of each approach are 
summarized in Table 2.2-1. Many of the existing Safety I practices can provide valuable insights. 
When adverse outcomes in complex sociotechnical systems cannot be explained using the 
principles of decomposition and causality, however, this is an indication that those methods are 
inadequate. In these circumstances, Safety II approaches to understanding events may add value. 
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Table 2.2-1. Comparison of Safety I and Safety II. 
Traditional Approach (Safety I) Emerging Approach (Safety II) 
Safety: When as few things as possible go 
wrong 
Safety: When as many things as possible go 
right 
Focus on predicting failure probabilities Focus on preparing for the unpredicted 
People are a liability—control, correct People are an asset—learn, adapt 
Variability is a threat—minimize it Variability is normal—manage it 
Focus on incident rates  Focus on learning 
Focus on what is not wanted: incidents and 
accidents 
Focus on what is wanted: how safety is created 
Procedures are complete and correct Procedures are always under-specified and must 
be interpreted and adapted 
Systems are well designed, work as 
designed, and are well maintained 
Systems are complex and will degrade; there 
will always be flaws and glitches 
The assessment team used the Resilience Analysis Grid (RAG) framework to provide a structure 
for instantiating Safety II thinking [Ref. 20]. The RAG identifies four capabilities of resilient 
performance: 
 Anticipate: Knowing what to expect, or being able to anticipate developments further 
into the future (e.g., potential disruptions, novel demands or constraints, new 
opportunities, changing operating conditions. 
 Monitor: Knowing what to look for, or being able to monitor that which is or could 
positively or negatively affect the system’s performance in the near term. 
 Respond: Knowing what to do, or being able to respond to regular and irregular changes, 
disturbances, and opportunities by activating prepared actions or by adjusting current 
mode of functioning 
 Learn: Knowing what has happened, or being able to learn from experience, in particular 
to learn the right lessons from the right experience. 
Each of these four capabilities can be systematically probed with questions designed to gauge the 
potential for that ability to be present and functional. The assessment team adopted this 
framework to aid in identifying operator behaviors that might be examples of resilient 
performance, defined as the ability of a system to sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following 
changes, disturbances, and opportunities [Ref. 2].  
2.3 State of Practice 
Several challenges are associated with existing accident and incident reporting and lessons-
learned approaches to understanding system safety: 
 Accident- and incident-based mitigations are reactive rather than proactive. 
 Accidents and incidents can be unique, with different patterns of contributing factors. 
Therefore, designed mitigation strategies may not generalize to other adverse events. 
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 In highly safe systems, there are few incidents or accidents, so these events cannot be 
relied upon for timely safety monitoring or improvement. 
Alternatively, risk assessment-based approaches to safety management take a more proactive 
stance by looking at what abnormal events could happen. However, none of these approaches 
focus systematically on what does happen every day. 
Observational safety surveys are being used in the ATC and flight deck domains as tools for 
helping organizations notice when performance is drifting toward a less safe state, or becoming 
more variable than desired. These surveys are direct observations conducted during a normal 
work period by trained observers who are also domain experts. The Normal Operations Safety 
Survey (NOSS) and the Day-to-Day Safety Survey (D2D) have been used in the ATC domain, 
and Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) have been used with pilots.  
NOSS and LOSA are based on a “threat and error management” model [Ref. 21]. In these 
approaches, trained observers capture data on recovery from undesirable states that occur from 
threats and errors that may develop during daily operations. Data from these observations 
provide lessons learned with regards to threats to safety and unexpected situations. Through the 
coding of threats and errors, key problem areas (e.g., incomplete handover briefings, distracting 
non-operational conversation, using incorrect procedure, etc.) are identified. This supports the 
goal of identifying and setting clear targets for operational safety enhancements. However, many 
safety-producing actions are taken by operators to anticipate and monitor events before threats 
manifest. 
The D2D survey, used by the National Air Traffic Services United Kingdom and the Irish 
Aviation Authority, includes direct observations of air traffic controllers and is focused on 
collecting data about positive and proactive behaviors [Ref. 22]. The intent of the D2D survey is 
to reveal trends to enhance understanding of what air traffic controllers do to maintain safe 
operations before a situation evolves into an undesirable state. The D2D survey is currently 
limited to five areas: visual scanning cycle, active listening, defensive controlling, write-as-you-
speak-read-as-you-listen; and strip management. This is a recent approach that is limited in scope 
and not in widespread use, but over time may provide insights into the actions that operators take 
to promote safe operations.  
Data from adverse event analyses have been used to create detailed taxonomies of human error, 
but rarely to capture human successes. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
[Ref. 23] and LOSA use databases that track systemic deficiencies without a coded structure for 
recovery (positive) factors. Rather, positive data are captured in the form of written narratives 
describing what the crew did well [Ref. 24]. These narratives are unstructured, capture positive 
behaviors in a happenstance fashion, and can be cumbersome to analyze by currently available 
techniques. Continued advances in natural language processing may represent an approach to 
facilitate analysis of narrative data [Ref. 25]. New approaches to analysis of narrative data will 
become increasingly important as the volume of collected data increases. For example, NASA’s 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) intakes an average of 1,964 new reports per week 
[Ref. 26]. 
Initial attempts have been made to develop taxonomies to capture positive behavior (Appendix 
B). The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the CAST developed a high-level 
classification of positive concepts, including definitions [Ref. 27]. The French Voluntary 
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Reporting System explicitly mentions dedicated fields for positive factors [Ref. 28]. 
Additionally, ASRS coding forms support the recording of “detection and resolutory actions” 
that can be linked to some occurrences recorded in the ASRS database. This list contains 34 
possible items describing, at various levels (e.g., flight crew, controller, aircraft or other), an 
action or an event that was involved in the resolution of an adverse situation.  
However, the emphasis in these taxonomies largely describes specific behaviors which, in the 
absence of associated situational factors, may or may not represent safety-producing 
performance (e.g., flight canceled/delayed, rejected takeoff, proper following of radio 
procedures). Rejecting a takeoff, for example, is not universally safer than continuing a takeoff, 
but depends on the specific context in which that decision was made. Thus, these classifications 
risk conflating operator behaviors with outcomes: Positive behaviors yield positive outcomes, 
and negative behaviors yield negative outcomes. While it is likely that a strong positive 
correlation exists between outcomes and preceding behaviors, operators may complete their 
missions despite risk-taking behaviors, particularly in ultra-safe systems that afford many 
opportunities to notice and mitigate these risks. Likewise, undesired outcomes can result despite 
appropriate operator actions. It is often during retrospective analysis that behaviors are identified 
as positive or negative, depending upon whether the outcome of the event was desired or 
undesired. Thus it is important to distinguish between behaviors that support resilient 
performance (i.e., universally desired behaviors) and behaviors that merely precede desired 
outcomes (i.e., behaviors which may or may not be desired) to support learning. This is critical in 
ensuring that the “right” lessons are learned from the “right” experiences. 
Outcomes can result from many possible conditions or combinations of factors, some of which 
may be transient. Therefore, causes identified during post hoc analyses of events are often 
reconstructed rather than found, or may be traced back only until resources for analysis are 
exhausted. Tools such as root cause analysis and error chain analysis, which seek to break 
systems down into components and identify likely associated threats or failures, are in 
widespread use for mishap investigation [Ref. 29]. A previous NESC assessment concluded that 
reliance on linear causal models (e.g., root cause analysis, fault tree analysis, error chains) 
contributed to missed identification of cues associated with mishap events [Ref. 30]. The 
simplifying assumptions of these models can work well for technological systems that can be 
decomposed into constituent parts, but they fail to accurately describe how success and failure 
occur in complex sociotechnical systems. Application of Safety II principles could enhance 
existing practices in mishap analysis in complex sociotechnical systems. 
Despite the large, and growing, number and volume of data sources that describe performance in 
commercial aviation, efforts to integrate these data are relatively new. One effort is the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
System. This system contains multiple databases of safety data, and is intended to promote the 
“open exchange of safety information in order to continuously improve aviation safety” [Ref. 
31]. However, much of the data shared through ASIAS has been de-identified by removing time-
of-flight and airline information. While this can protect operators and organizations from 
punitive or legal action, de-identification prohibits reliable integration with other data sources, 
which depend upon that information to sync disparate databases. 
The global aviation enterprise is a complex, adaptive system full of variability. Daily operational 
flexibility by human and organizations within the governing technologies, functions, and 
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procedures keep the system extraordinarily safe and efficient. Additional approaches are needed 
to systematically detect and analyze the resilient behaviors and strategies employed within this 
complex sociotechnical system. Understanding how operators contribute toward creating and 
maintaining safety will better prepare the research and operational communities to address the 
following questions: 
 What factors contribute to the current safety record in commercial aviation? 
 How robust is system safety to the intended and unintended consequences of changes in 
technology, functions, and procedures? 
 How should system safety be evaluated during design of new technologies, functions, and 
procedures? 
 How can operational system safety metrics be developed that are sensitive to early 
signals of departure from expected operations which could either negatively or positively 
affect system performance? 
2.4 Scope 
The civil aviation system includes humans in many roles, including but not limited to: 
 Pilots 
 Cabin crew 
 ATC tower controllers 
 Terminal radar approach controllers 
 En route controllers 
 Traffic management units 
 ATC system command center personnel 
 Airline dispatchers 
 Aircraft maintainers 
 Ramp personnel 
The assessment team focused on commercial air transport operations, and specifically on the 
roles of pilots and air traffic control tower controllers. The assessment team focused primarily on 
the behavior of individual operators rather than teams or organizations. Furthermore, the 
assessment team limited analysis to datasets that were rapidly obtainable and/or already familiar 
to the team members. The assessment was scoped in these ways to accommodate the time 
constraints of the assessment, while providing a representative and extensible approach to 
assessing human contributions to safety in civil aviation. 
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3.0 Data Analysis 
The assessment team conducted several tasks as part of data analysis, including identification of: 
 Candidate data and data sources that could be included in analysis of resilient operator 
performance in routine operations. 
 A theoretical framework for structuring and organizing identified resilient actions. 
 A candidate list of human actions that reflect resilient performance in routine operations. 
 Techniques for exploring the identified behaviors in objective system-based datasets. 
To begin to understand and characterize resilient behaviors, the assessment team leveraged 
multiple data sources in complementary ways. First, potential data sources were identified and 
down-selected for inclusion in the NESC analysis. Second, an existing theoretical framework for 
resilience strategies was identified to guide data acquisition strategies and to structure and 
organize identified behaviors. Third, subjective data sources were used to identify insights into 
specific resilient operator behaviors. Fourth, the assessment team adapted existing data analytics 
approaches to explore how these resilient strategies might manifest in system-based data. 
The results of these analyses were used to generate findings, observations, and NESC 
recommendations, identified in Section 4, with regard to feasibility of and guidance for data 
collection and analysis of resilient operator behavior in routine situations. 
3.1 Identification of Candidate Data and Data Sources 
Systematic collection of resilient behaviors in everyday operations requires leveraging existing 
potential data sources and, where there are gaps, identifying new opportunities to collect 
information. Data sources can be broadly grouped into three classes: 
 Operator-based data includes information from self-reports of events (e.g., ASRS) and 
interviews with operators about their lived experiences. 
 Observer-based data includes information from direct inspection of operators by trained 
observers (e.g., LOSA, NOSS). 
 System-based data includes information recorded or displayed by a system about its state 
or environment (e.g., flight data recorder data). 
The assessment team identified several potential sources of aviation data that could apply to 
operator resilient performance. These data sources were classified according to their availability, 
temporal resolution, source for obtaining data, data type (e.g., continuous, categorical, textual, 
auditory), data format, and generating source (i.e., system, observer, operator). The identified 
data sources, listed in Appendix C, provide a representative although not complete sample. 
Each of these classes of data affords insights into different aspects of routine performance. The 
current analysis focused on insights that could be derived from operator-based subjective 
operator interviews and system-based objective flight recorder data. Subject interviews can 
provide valuable insights into operator state, intentions, goals, pressures, and knowledge, 
whereas flight recorder data can provide occurrence rates and objective validation of 
subjectively-described events. Taken together, subjective and objective data can create a more 
complete and interpretable description of work-as-done. 
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3.2 Identification of Factors that Reflect Resilient Actions 
Systematic analysis of resilient behaviors in routine operations requires a framework for 
organizing and making sense of the collected data. The assessment team adapted a framework 
developed by Rankin et al. [Ref. 16] to describe strategies that support resilient performance. 
This framework was developed as a tool to structure, organize, and analyze operator behaviors in 
daily work situations in complex systems. The framework focuses on identification of strategies; 
the enablers and conditions under which the strategy was applied; the properties of resilient 
performance supported by the strategy; and the source of the strategy (see Figure 3.2-1). 
 
Figure 3.2-1. Strategy framework. 
The primary elements of the framework include: 
 Strategy – The adaptations and countermeasures used to cope with variations in the 
dynamic environment. 
 Objective – Intentions and goals, including any competing/conflicting pressures or goals. 
 Context – Forces and situational conditions under which the strategy is conducted. 
Includes external (e.g., weather) and internal (e.g., organizational pressures) forces that 
act on a system to produce the “trade space” in which work is performed. 
 Resources – The necessary conditions for successfully implementing the strategy. 
Includes tools (e.g., hardware, software, automation) and knowledge (e.g., training, 
experience, creativity). Helps identify what enables or hinders implementation of the 
strategy. 
 Resilience Capability – Refers to the four capabilities of resilient performance (i.e., 
anticipating, monitoring, responding, and learning [Ref. 20]. A strategy may pertain to 
one or more of these capabilities. 
 Actors/Interactions – Refers to where within the system the strategy is designed and 
executed ranging from locally to globally. Actors can be defined in terms of areas of 
application (e.g., flight deck operations, dispatch, maintenance, ATC, ground operations, 
infrastructure, regulatory, etc.), and in terms of organizational level and necessary 
interactions (e.g., individual, team, organization, business sector, etc.) [Ref. 32]. 
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Literature is sparse in terms of operational strategies associated with the four capabilities of 
resilient performance. Lay et al. [Ref. 11] identified strategies employed by organizations within 
the context of power plant maintenance, including: 
 Anticipate knowledge gaps and needs. 
 Anticipate resource gaps and needs. 
 (Monitor) Support processes of sense-making. 
 (Monitor) Support reflective processes. 
 (Respond) Manage deployed resources. 
 (Respond) Provision of extra resources. 
 (Respond) Manage priorities. 
 (Learn) Use questions to trigger learning. 
These strategies were used by the assessment team as a representative starting point for 
identifying strategies employed by operators in a civil aviation context, as described in Sections 
3.3 and 3.4. 
3.3 Identification of Candidate Actions by Operators that Reflect Resilient Performance 
Pilot and ATC tower controllers were interviewed by assessment team members using interview 
protocols designed to elicit specific examples of resilient performance in routine operational 
situations. This approach focused on identifying behaviors and strategies based on the specific 
lived experience of the participants in an attempt to focus as closely as possible on work-as-done 
rather than work-as-imagined. In contrast, previous research on pilot and controller resilient 
performance [Ref. 33] presented operators in a group setting with descriptions of a disturbance, 
then asked how they would detect and deal with the situation. While many of the presented 
disturbances were common, whether a participant had actually experienced each of the 
disturbances was not reported. 
For this assessment, pilot and controller participants were recruited in different ways, which 
affected the opportunity for data collection from each group. Therefore, the pilot and controller 
data collections are addressed separately. 
3.3.1 Airline Pilot Interviews 
Method 
The objective for the airline pilot interviews was to obtain data that would allow opportunity to: 
(a) identify strategies/behaviors that exhibit emergent resilience properties; (b) identify 
methods/approaches for extracting strategies/behaviors from existing data sources; and  
(c) identify gaps/opportunities for future data collection. 
Participants 
Twenty-one airline pilots were recruited to participate. All participants were employed by a 
major airline operating under Federal Aviation Regulations part 121. Participants were identified 
based on their availability and willingness to participate and were not remunerated financially. 
Pilot participants were interviewed at a US airport during their break times between flights. In an 
effort to be as sensitive as possible to their available time, demographic information about the 
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participants was not obtained. All interviews were conducted under approval from NASA’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Confidentiality was maintained through use of subject 
numbers not associated with participant names or other personally identifying information. 
Materials 
Interviews were recorded using commercial off-the-shelf software on a laptop computer using 
the internal microphone. An assessment team member listened to the recorded files and created a 
transcribed version using Microsoft Word.  
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed in an airport conference room with the door closed. First, 
participants reviewed and signed a consent form explaining the nature of the study and their 
voluntary participation. Next, the introductory statement and initial question was read aloud by 
an assessment team member (see Appendix D). Two team members were present during the 
interviews; one took notes while the other operated the recording equipment and guided the 
interviews. 
Participants were asked to describe a specific unplanned or unexpected event they had 
experienced in the course of routine operations. This initial question was designed to elicit an 
experience likely to include examples of resilient performance: anticipating, monitoring, 
responding, and learning [Ref. 20]. Follow-up questions for each of these areas were available to 
the interviewers to ensure they targeted those aspects of performance. Participants were not 
asked to quantify occurrence rates of events. In some cases, depending on time availability, 
multiple events were captured from a participant. The interview results provided the assessment 
team with: (1) descriptions of specific instances of pilots adapting, and (2) insights into the 
pilots’ goals, motivations, pressures, and knowledge. 
Results 
Line-by-line coding of transcribed interviews was used to identify various elements of the 
strategies framework as described by the pilots. Concept mapping was used to describe 
interdependencies among these elements: the behaviors, resources, objectives, context elements, 
and resilience capabilities. An example concept map depicting the action of changing pace of 
operations for a slower preceding aircraft is illustrated in Figure 3.3.1-1. 
Non-linearity in the system is described by the interconnectedness of the nodes in the concept 
map. In addition, disparate temporal ranges are depicted by the separate times at which learning 
and monitoring occurred. Some learning that occurred during this situation was not immediately 
related to it and was stored for later use, depending on the outcome of the event. In contrast, 
some previous learning was applied to this event from a time before the event happened. 
Competing goals were discussed by participants describing the intent of other actors in the 
system. For example, pilots with the goal of a smooth approach were countered by ATC asking 
for a steeper than normal approach for traffic flow demands. Although this may not be ideal, it 
describes a complex domain that cannot always completely satisfy one user. Rather than a fixed 
ideal, participants described their goal system as a hierarchy, with safety being the foundation 
and other goals like helping, efficiency, and comfort taking a lower priority. This allows the 
users to negotiate based on their willingness to concede or the perceived risk that a concession 
might evoke.  
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Figure 3.3.1-1. Concept map depicting change in operational pace in response to a slower 
preceding aircraft. 
Several participants noted that sharing actionable information, amending plans so others could 
benefit, and teaching or compensating for other people was part of their job. These actions may 
seem counterintuitive in an environment in which airlines compete, but the processes and 
practices reported had established structures and expectations. This supports the notion that 
hierarchies of goals likely exist outside of prescribed regulations and policies. For example, 
pilots reported information over party-line frequencies to inform other aircraft that they had 
struck a bird. That information was immediately actionable to a plane behind them and 
actionable to ATC for warning other pilots and airport staff. However, this action did not directly 
benefit the plane that struck the bird, and, in fact required additional resources to communicate. 
Insights from concept maps and assessment team discussions were used to identify strategies for 
resilient performance linked to the events and behaviors that the participants described (see 
Table 3.3.1-1). It is noteworthy that many of the reported behaviors associated with participants’ 
ability to anticipate, monitor, and respond require leveraging experience-based information. 
However, no methods exist to systematically report or capture this information. This is a missed 
opportunity for developing training, data systems, and procedures whereby operators could 
systematically benefit from others’ lived experiences, not just their own. 
18 
Table 3.3.1-1. Identified resilient performance strategies employed by operators  
in routine aviation contexts. 
 Strategy Description Reported Behaviors 
Anticipate 
Anticipate procedure limits. Predict when the current context 
inhibits the normal use of a 
procedure, regulation, policy, or 
norm. 
Anticipate when formal procedure 
(e.g., STAR) will not work. 
Anticipate knowledge gaps. Predict whether a crew member or 
other actor in the system lacks 
required minimum knowledge. 
Anticipate others’ intent. 
Anticipate resource gaps. Compare the level of resources 
(e.g., fuel, time, workload, etc.) to 
perceived needs from experience 
or training. 
Anticipate need to “buy time.” 
  Compare time needed and time 
available for action. 
Prepare alternate plan and 
identify conditions for 
triggering. 
Have an actionable plan ready 
within the time available. Predict 
available time and what might 
work. 
Request land at alternate airport 
(e.g., due to weather) or runway. 
  Go-around (e.g., if preceding 
aircraft does not exit the runway. 
Monitor 
Monitor environment for 
cues that signal a change 
from normal operations. 
Identify triggering variables that 
signal something has changed from 
what was expected. 
Monitor for “non-standard” 
signals/cues. 
  Monitor for deviations from normal 
pace of operations. 
  Monitor for deviations from normal 
control “feel.” 
Monitor environment for 
cues that signal a need to 
adjust or deviate from 
current plan. 
Identify triggering variables that 
signal something will not continue 
to work as planned. 
Monitor party-line communications. 
  Monitor locations of aircraft in the 
area. 
  Monitor others’ workload. 
  Monitor for cues (e.g., voice) of 
flight crew’s experience and stress 
level. 
Monitor own internal state. Perform self-assessment of 
physiological state, emotional 
state, workload, or knowledge. 
Monitor own workload. 
  Monitor own limits and capabilities. 
Respond 
Adjust current plan to 
accommodate others. 
Help others in the system by 
changing timing or other action. 
Change speed to accommodate 
other aircraft. 
Adjust or deviate from 
current plan based on risk 
assessment. 
Change plan based on monitoring 
of triggers associated with safety 
boundaries. 
Deviate from procedure based on 
risk assessment. 
Negotiate adjustment or 
deviation from current plan. 
Work with others to accommodate 
competing goals and come to a 
solution that is mutually acceptable 
to all 
Negotiate route change. 
19 
Defer adjusting or deviating 
from plan to collect more 
information. 
Continue with current plan because 
acting without critical information 
could make situation worse. 
Defer action until more information 
is available. 
Manage available 
resources. 
Preserve finite resources by 
adjusting controllable aspects of 
the situation. 
Divide/take/give tasks to balance 
workload. 
  Outsource tasks to automation or 
decision aids. 
Recruit additional 
resources. 
Obtain resources locally or 
externally.  
Ask others for assistance/resources. 
  Ask others for information and/or 
clarification. 
Manage priorities. Change goals, task order, task 
content, or pace of operation to 
accommodate resource limitations. 
Adjust timing or speed of tasks 
based on operation pace and 
workload. 
  Balance competing goals of formal 
expectations (e.g., follow 
procedures, maintain margins, 
comfort of passengers/pilots, 
smooth ride, reduce workload) 
  Shed/abbreviate tasks to fit 
timeline/pace of operations. 
Learn 
Leverage experience and 
learning to modify or 
deviate from plan. 
Compare formal expectations and 
experience to current situation to 
develop real-time assessment of 
acceptability or risk. 
Predict likelihood of events based 
on past experience. 
  Consider historical occurrences 
with similar contexts. 
  Mentally simulate procedure. 
  Use heuristics/rule-of-thumb 
guidelines.  
Understand formal 
expectations. 
Understand applicability of laws, 
procedures, policies, and cultural 
norms.  
Know and apply formal 
expectations (e.g., procedures, 
regulations, company policies, 
weather forecasting). 
Facilitate others’ learning Share information with others to 
increase their immediate 
understanding and long-term 
learning. 
Teach other crew- or team-
members. 
  Share actionable information with 
other aircraft/ATC. 
3.3.2 ATC Tower Controller Interviews 
As with the pilot interviews, the primary objective for the ATC controller interviews was to 
obtain data that would allow opportunity to: (a) identify strategies/behaviors that exhibit 
emergent resilience properties; (b) identify methods/approaches for extracting 
strategies/behaviors from existing data sources; and (c) identify gaps/opportunities for future 
data collection.  
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Method 
Participants 
Twelve air traffic controllers were recruited to participate in the study. Controller interviews 
were conducted at NASA Langley Research Center, and participants were off-duty on the day of 
their interview. All of the controller participants were highly experienced, with an average 
experience level of 33 years. 
All interviews were conducted under approval from NASA’s IRB. Confidentiality was 
maintained through use of subject numbers not associated with participant names or other 
personally identifying information. 
Materials 
Interviews were recorded using commercial off-the-shelf software on a laptop computer using 
the internal microphone. An assessment team member transcribed the recorded files using 
Microsoft® Word®. Questionnaires were also administered (see Appendix E). 
Procedure 
Interviews were conducted over three days, with one group of four controllers participating each 
day. The participants were assigned randomly to one of three groups of four controllers to 
facilitate data collection. For each group, the session began with participants reviewing and 
signing an informed consent form explaining the objectives and details of the study and 
voluntary participation.  
Participants were provided with an introductory presentation that included an overview of the 
concept and principles of resilience engineering including descriptions of each of the four 
“cornerstones” of resilience performance: anticipating, monitoring, responding, and learning 
[Ref. 20]. 
Each participant was subsequently interviewed individually by members of the assessment team 
using a semi-structured protocol that solicited examples of resilient behaviors that they had 
observed or experienced as controllers (see Appendix D). Each interview lasted approximately 
45 minutes. Participants also completed a written questionnaire while the other controllers in 
their group were being individually interviewed. 
After completion of the individual interviews and questionnaires, all four controllers participated 
in a group discussion facilitated by assessment team members. The objective of the group 
discussion was to collect information about strategies used by controllers to promote system 
resilience, rather than those based on specific events or episodes. 
Results 
The individual interview protocol used with ATC participants was adapted directly from the 
protocol developed for pilot participants. Minor changes were made to the wording of the initial 
probe question to reflect a focus on ATC rather than flight deck operations. Strategies and 
behaviors indicating resilient performance were identified from interview notes and recordings, 
and are integrated with data from pilot participants in Table 3.3.2-1. 
In responses to the administered questionnaire, all participants indicated that they exhibited 
resilient performance on the job as air traffic controllers. The result indicated that 83% (N = 10) 
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estimated “at least once per session,” where a “session” refers to each one of the multiple times 
that a controller works at their position during an 8-hour daily work shift. “At least once every  
2 weeks” (N = 1) and “at least once daily” (N = 1) were the other responses.  
Results showed that 75% of participants (N = 9) stated that they make traffic management 
decisions not explicitly specified by policies or procedures (e.g., FAA Order JO 7110.65, 
facilities standard operating procedures, letters of agreement) “at least once per week” with 58% 
(N = 7) estimating the occurrence to be “at least once daily.” The participants were further asked, 
“How many of these decision would you categorize as ‘resilient’ decisions”? The responses 
were: 75% estimated “more than 50%” (N = 9), and 58% indicated “more than 90%” (N = 7).  
Participants were asked to indicate the prevalence of eight behavioral components associated 
with resilience principles, as identified by Heese, Kallus, and Kolodej [Ref. 34]. Participants’ 
estimates of the frequencies of these behavior are shown in Table 3.3.2-1. 
Table 3.3.2-1. Participant estimates of frequency of behaviors associated with resilience. 
 Less 
Than 
Once Per 
Month 
At Least 
Once Per 
Month 
At Least 
Once 
Every  
2 Weeks 
At Least 
Once Per 
Week 
At Least 
Once 
Daily 
At Least 
Once Per 
Session 
More 
Than 
Once Per 
Session 
Finding goal-directed and proactive 
solutions that require trading for 
conflicting goals such as capacity, 
efficiency, and costs   
  
1 
 
4 3 4 
Anticipating needs for planning and 
coordination   
1 
 
1 2 8 
Using judgment for improvisation of 
standard operating procedures for 
safety/efficiency/capacity purposes 
   
2 2 2 6 
Inventing work-around procedures 
and techniques that work better for 
actual practice 
1 2 
 
4 2 1 2 
Applying flexibility to increase safety 
buffers and defensive controlling for 
buffering capacity, margins, and 
added safety tolerance 
   
1 
 
4 7 
Providing team support and adaptive 
capacity as required   
1 
 
1 2 8 
Utilizing resources as required, such 
as consulting written/printed 
documentation (manuals, procedures) 
or electronic information (e.g., 
Aeronautical Information 
Publications online, route charts for 
alternative waypoints) 
1 
  
4 2 4 1 
Developing strategies for managing 
workload 
1 1 
 
2 3 1 4 
Although controllers reported that they exhibit behaviors that support resilient performance on a 
routine basis, there is little focus on collecting, analyzing, or characterizing these behaviors. 
One objective of the focus group discussion was to identify how controllers use event reporting 
systems and their applicability and utility for obtaining data on resilient behaviors through these 
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systems. All of the participants in the assessment sample stated that they had filed incident 
reports through one or more safety reporting systems. However, none of the participants stated 
that their narrative descriptions focused on detailing positive behaviors that demonstrate resilient 
performance. During focus group discussions, all participants agreed that there should exist a 
system to collect inputs describing positive incidents, when things go right. The controllers 
stated that the FAA has an outlet in which controllers can file incidents that reflect “going above 
and beyond”. However the culture within the ATC community that “it was their job” to adapt to 
routine disturbances, and showing resilient behavior was “what they get paid to do” created 
barriers to submitting positive event reports. Participants believed that, in the current cultural 
environment, controllers might be reluctant to file positive incidents except in the case of 
extraordinary performance (e.g., talking a novice pilot through clouds to land in bad weather).  
A barrier to positive event reporting is that reporting systems are structured to capture negative 
events (i.e., when things go wrong). For example, ASRS provides several Event Assessment 
codes to categorize type of anomaly (14 categories), primary problem (17 categories), and 
contributing problem areas (16 categories). There is also a code for the resulting action, but only 
four categories are provided for ATC: (1) issued advisory/alert, (2) issued new clearance,  
(3) provided assistance, and (4) separated traffic [Ref. 28, see Appendix B]. The numbers of 
categories for characterizing the reported events suggest an emphasis on describing what went 
wrong, not on the actions that controllers might take to resolve the reported anomaly. 
Therefore, the assessment team asked participants to list additional actions controllers take in 
response to anomalies that might be used to supplement the existing categories, resulting in the 
following list: 
 Corrected read-back 
 Provided weather information 
 Intervened to prevent unsafe situation 
 Anticipated potential problem 
 Developed strategic plan to avoid a problem 
 Adjusted traffic flow 
 Cancelled clearance (e.g., takeoff or landing) 
 Coordinated support 
 Anticipated needs of pilot 
 Anticipated flow issues 
 Verified pilot intentions 
 Repeated transmission for emphasis 
 Communicated with professionalism/clarity 
 Offered options/alternatives 
 Monitored for changes 
 Anticipated and adjusted for unexpected event 
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In the group discussion, controller participants suggested providing guided assistance for 
furnishing narrative details to ensure that filed reports focused on desired aspects or features of 
resilient performance.  
3.4 Techniques for Exploring Identified Factors in System-Based Data 
Although operator-based data (e.g., structured interviews and self-reports) can provide rich data 
with regard to intentions, goals, pressures, or operator state, recollection-based approaches are 
subject to the reconstructive nature of human memory [Ref. 35]. Examination of system-based 
objective data can substantiate subjective accounts and provide quantifiable details that are 
difficult or impossible to obtain from subjective data alone. Furthermore, system-based data 
provide a direct link to work-as-done, because the data can be the product of operator actions.  
Based on the strategies and behaviors identified through operator interviews (see Table 3.3.1-1), 
the assessment team considered how these strategies might manifest in aircraft flight data. Two 
candidate strategies were selected for exploration: 1) “anticipate resource gaps” (Anticipate), and 
2) “manage priorities” (Respond). To explore the “anticipate resource gaps” strategy, the 
assessment team examined pilot behaviors associated with taking preemptive actions to prevent 
unstable approaches. To explore the “manage priorities” strategy, the assessment team examined 
pilot behaviors associated with the timing of performing pre-takeoff control surface checks. Each 
of these analyses is described in detail in the following section. 
3.4.1 Exploring “Anticipate Resource Gaps” Strategy in Aircraft Flight Data 
Interview participants reported behaviors in which they used their experience to anticipate when 
resources will approach functional boundaries (e.g., when will I run out of fuel, time, or space to 
execute a planned maneuver). That is, operators reported proactively seeking to maintain “the 
cushion of potential actions and additional resources that allow the system to continue 
functioning and adapting,” known as margins of maneuver [Ref. 11]. The assessment team 
posited that a pilot’s use of this strategy might manifest in objective aircraft flight data as the 
pilot taking action to preempt an adverse state (i.e., a state indicating that one or more resources 
had reached their functional boundaries). In the current case study, the assessment team focused 
on adjustments made by pilots during descent to preempt a high-speed exceedance at 1000 feet. 
This approach leverages the idea of searching for degraded states that may arise during 
operations and detecting when these states are resolved (i.e., the operation is no longer in a 
degraded state). The assessment team identified degraded states using a machine-learning 
algorithm called deep temporal multiple instance learning [Ref. 36]. This algorithm was designed 
to detect states ahead of a predefined known adverse event, as defined/validated by subject 
matter experts, that has a high probability of predicting that adverse event. These states indicate a 
precursor to that event if the degraded state is not resolved. DT-MIL (Deep Temporal - Multiple 
Instance Learning) uses a deep learning neural network to build a model that classifies 
multivariate time series as resulting in the adverse event or not.  
The DT-MIL algorithm was implemented in Python, using Anaconda 2.7 with Keras and 
Tensorflow modules for parallel processing. The algorithm provided a continuous measurement 
of the precursor probability that may rise and fall based on the states that it detected throughout 
the time series. When the precursor probability decreased, this served as an indication that an 
action may have been taken to shift the operation to a more “nominal state” in which resource 
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margins were maintained. This shift could be quantified by comparing the difference between the 
degraded state and the new resolved state. 
This method was demonstrated using FOQA data. Commercial airlines with FOQA programs 
use data from flight data recorders to monitor daily operations. These data are analyzed using 
predefined thresholds to flag and trend known adverse events of interest to the airline. The 
adverse event used in this example was a high speed exceedance at 1000 feet (ft.). This is one of 
a handful of FOQA flags that are monitored to identify a category of unstable approaches. A 
sample of 500 adverse event flights and 500 non-event flights were analyzed. Each flight 
contained 300 variables, of which 60 were selected using domain knowledge and automated 
feature selection based on Granger causality [Ref. 37]. The algorithm was randomly split into 
50% training, 30% validation, and 20% testing. Because this assessment focused on preemptive 
actions, the non-event flights were examined for high precursor probabilities. Two examples of 
flights that resulted in high precursor probabilities followed by the lowering of probabilities are 
shown in Figures 3.4.1-1 and 3.4.1-2. The x-axis measures distance in nautical miles (NM) from 
the point at which the aircraft reaches 1000 ft. altitude. The solid blue line is the time series trace 
for each of the selected parameters that describe the precursor. The black dotted lines indicate the 
10th-90th percentiles of the non-event data for each parameter for 0.25 NM binned distances to 
the event. The bottom right trace is the computed precursor score that DT-MIL provided for each 
sample of the time series. Samples for which the precursor score was greater than 0.5 are marked 
with red dots in the parameter traces and are considered high-probability precursors of a high-
speed exceedance at the end of the time series. The shaded green region in the precursor score 
plot represents the event of interest, in which a degraded state was identified and potential for a 
preemptive action was indicated.  
In Figure 3.4.1-1, the primary flight display (PFD) selected speed was higher than in the nominal 
distribution, which begins to step down at this point in the flight. When the PFD selected speed 
was reset to a lower value, the aircraft pitched up slightly and returned to nominal range, 
resulting in a decrease in airspeed. At this point the precursor probability sharply decreased. The 
algorithm identified a state that, if left uncorrected, had a high probability of leading to the high-
speed exceedance. One insight that can be gained from this scenario is that the system is 
dynamically variable and flexibility is needed to safely accommodate other needs of the system. 
This may require pilots to drift outside the “normal” operating bounds as defined by typical 
flights, but the system can continue to safely operate by maintaining the resource margins 
necessary to adapt to changing and even unexpected demands.  
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Figure 3.4.1-1. Time series plots for PFD selected speed, pitch angle, computed airspeed,  
and precursor score are depicted for a flight in which a preemptive action (i.e., resetting speed)  
was taken to avoid a high-speed exceedance at 1000 ft.  
In Figure 3.4.1-2, the descent rate, captured by the vertical speed, was significantly lower than 
the normal distribution at that point in the flight (i.e., more negative vertical speed indicates 
faster decent rate in feet/minute). During this period, the airspeed was trending upward toward 
the upper bound of the nominal distribution. At this point, the pilot slowed the aircraft’s descent 
rate and the airspeed began to hold steady. Although the airspeed remained outside the normal 
distribution, the transfer of the aircraft’s energy from potential (i.e., altitude) to kinetic  
(i.e., airspeed) reduced the probability of a high-speed exceedance adverse event. Although the 
airspeed was above the 90th percentile for non-event flights during the event snapshot, it did not 
trigger the FOQA exceedance flag at 1000 ft. Increasing speed to avoid triggering a high-speed 
exceedance later in the flight may seem counter-intuitive, but it is common for pilots to employ 
this technique of trading altitude for speed. When the aircraft’s energy is transitioned from 
altitude to speed, there are more tools available to the pilot to reduce kinetic energy by 
introducing drag (e.g., through use of speed brakes, lowering landing gear, and/or deploying 
flaps). These energy-bleeding practices can significantly slow the aircraft in a shorter amount of 
time and distance, compared with allowing the flight to descend on a shallower glide path to 
avoid increasing speed. 
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Figure 3.4.1-2. Time series plots for vertical speed, altitude, computed airspeed, and precursor 
score are depicted for a flight in which a preemptive action (i.e., slowing descent rate) was taken 
to avoid a high-speed exceedance at 1000 ft. 
Both scenarios show situations in which a flight reached a state with an elevated probability of 
leading to an adverse event, but actions were taken in time to reduce this probability. Crew 
actions are the result of a combination of factors that include training, experience, intentions, and 
context. In this example, fundamental flight training provided pilots with knowledge of common 
available actions to get back on the vertical path. Experience in the aircraft and the ability to 
mentally simulate its future state was needed to anticipate a required action, choose an 
appropriate action, and choose the implementation timeframe for the action. Contextual factors 
such as weather, traffic, and crew coordination also likely influenced what, how, and when 
action was taken. 
FOQA data can provide many quantitative details about operator and vehicle performance, but 
cannot provide information about the knowledge state, motivation, or broader context for the 
event. Why was the pilot flying the arrival at a higher than normal airspeed? What cues triggered 
the pilot to take action? If there were multiple appropriate actions that could have been taken, 
why did the pilot select that specific action? The answers to these questions could be obtained 
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through observer- and operator-based data to supplement system-based data and provide a more 
complete understanding of work-as-done.  
Although these “precursor” states are not considered unsafe in and of themselves, the algorithm 
has defined these states as indicative of patterns with a high probability of leading to an adverse 
event (e.g., an unstable approach). The fact that these flights did not lead to the adverse event 
indicates the resilience of the system, afforded by the actions of the pilots, to handle these 
situations and function safely. 
3.4.2 Exploring “Manage Priorities” Strategy in Aircraft Flight Data 
Interviews indicated that operators manage priorities by adjusting the timing or pace of 
operations to accommodate resource limitations (e.g., workload). To find evidence of pilots’ use 
of this strategy in FOQA data, the assessment team examined pre-takeoff control surface checks 
in taxiing aircraft. In this procedure, the pilot checks the aircraft’s control surfaces by 
moving/rotating them to their maximum positive and negative angles. This pre-flight check is 
performed on the rudder, ailerons, and elevators. While performing these checks prior to take-off 
is a procedural requirement, the specific timing and spatial location is left to the discretion of the 
operator. The assessment team reasoned that if pilots were strategically managing priorities, 
there would be detectable patterns in when or where they decided to perform the control surface 
check.  
Evidence of pre-takeoff control surface checks were identified in FOQA data for departures at 
Barcelona-El Prat airport by looking for consecutive full-range motion in rudder angle, aileron 
angle, and elevator angle for aircraft on the airport surface. In this case study, the time and 
spatial location of the procedure were identified for 980 departures and plotted on an airport map 
(see Figure 3.4.2-1).  
 
Figure 3.4.2-1. (a) Taxi routes of flights taking off from Barcelona airport. Routes are overlaid on 
a heat map indicating regions where control surface checks were performed. (b) Numbered 
regions indicate regions where control surface checks were most commonly performed. 
Numbering is in descending order of number of flight checks performed per 980 flights. 
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While there was not a specific time or place along the taxiway where the pilots performed the 
control surface check, clear patterns emerged. The five areas where the checks were performed 
most often were identified and examined (see Table 3.4.2-1). Taken together, these areas 
represented approximately two-thirds (67.7%) of the locations where control surface checks were 
made. Approximately half of the checks (48.8%) were performed at a single 90-degree 
intersection, as pilots were turning onto the taxiway parallel to the runway. Four of the five most 
common check areas were along this taxiway, and all of the top five areas represented 
intersections where pilots made 90-degree turns. None of the pilots performed the control surface 
check before starting to taxi.  
Table 3.4.2-1. Flights that performed control surface check procedure following turn during taxi 
to runway. (Region numbers correspond to regions indicated in Figure 3.4.2-1.) 
Full turn region no. No. of flights % of 980 flights 
1 478 48.8 
2 73 7.5 
3 54 5.5 
4 38 3.9 
5 20 2.0 
Total 663 67.7 
Checking control surfaces is one of several tasks associated with preparing the aircraft for 
takeoff. To accomplish the control surface check, pilots must estimate how long they have until 
takeoff, how long each of their other tasks will take, and plan the timing of the check 
accordingly. Thus, the checks are likely to occur at different locations depending on contextual 
variables (e.g., traffic, airport familiarity, visibility, etc.). The ability to dynamically interleave 
tasks based on context is not explicitly trained, but rather a function of individual experience 
which helps pilots understand how traffic moves around airports, how long the procedures take 
for them to complete, and specific airport norms and customs. 
Although FOQA data cannot directly reveal pilot intentions, the patterns of observed behaviors 
suggest several possible motivations. For example, pilots might check control surfaces in region 
1 or 3 (See Figure 3.4.2-1.) because this is the portion of the taxi where pilots can likely see the 
runway and the line of aircraft, and they can make a high-confidence estimate that takeoff will 
happen soon. In addition, taxi workload is reduced here because taxiway navigation to the 
runway is assured at this point (i.e., only one plausible taxi path to the runway). Performing 
checks in regions 2 or 5 may be the result of high traffic volume and slower taxi speeds (i.e., 
waiting in a line of planes). Planes will be released at predictable intervals for takeoff, and the 
pilots could defer the checks based on the number of preceding airplanes. Performing checks in 
region 4 could be due to an unusually fast taxi that requires completing tasks earlier than normal 
to accommodate the pace of operations. 
While the specific reasons for the timing of the control surface checks cannot be definitively 
determined from FOQA data, the existence of discernible patterns in the timing of behavior 
across pilots performing a task with discretionary timing parameters suggests that the observed 
performance variance occurred for strategic reasons. Targeted follow-up interviews with pilots 
who fly at this airport could provide critical details about the intentions, internal states, and 
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knowledge behind the observed behaviors. This example further illustrates the synergistic 
relationship between subjective and objective data in understanding work-as-done and the 
strategies that human operators use to accomplish their work both safely and efficiently. 
4.0 Findings, Observations, and NESC Recommendations 
4.1 Findings 
The following findings were identified: 
F-1. NASA and industry planning and system design in aviation are based on Safety I 
principles and methods, focused on predicting and preventing errors. 
F-2. Current industry and regulatory safety reporting processes and mechanisms are designed 
to capture events that degrade safety (e.g., violations, deviations, and non-compliance 
with rules and procedures; human errors; etc.), but not positive events that bolster safety. 
F-3. Operators identified cultural barriers to reporting routine positive behaviors, because 
adapting to routine disturbances was seen as expected job performance. 
F-4. Current observer-based approaches to data collection and analysis (e.g., LOSA, NOSS) 
do not systematically include resilient behaviors. 
F-5. Many of the behaviors reported by pilots and controllers that are associated with their 
ability to anticipate, monitor, and respond require leveraging experience-based 
information that is not systematically reported or captured. 
F-6. Existing operator behavior taxonomies conflate “positive” operator behaviors with 
“positive” operational outcomes and “negative” operator behaviors with “negative” 
operational outcomes. 
F-7. Defining safety in terms of “things that go right” enabled new methods for exploring 
existing data. 
F-8. Operators were able to introspect about and provide specific examples of resilient 
behaviors. 
F-9. Evidence of operator strategies that promote resilient performance was identified in 
objective system-based data. 
F-10. Subjective and objective data sources contributed different information toward building 
an understanding of pilots’ and controllers’ resilient performance. 
F-11. Current approaches for safety data collection and analysis are not designed to integrate 
data from disparate data sources. 
F-12. Subjective data sources are necessary to understand the rationale for actions observed in 
objective data. 
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4.2 Observations  
The following observations were identified: 
O-1. NASA’s mishap investigation process is an area in which Safety II principles and 
methods that focus on behaviors that promote resilient performance could be applied to 
complement current approaches. 
O-2. Information sharing among operators is critical for avoiding known risks and managing 
resources. 
4.3 NESC Recommendations 
The following NESC recommendations were identified and directed toward NASA ARMD’s 
Transformative Aeronautics Concepts Program and Airspace Operations and Safety Program: 
R-1. Define safety in terms of the presence of desired behaviors as well as the absence of 
undesired behaviors. (F-1, F-7) 
 Justification: Defining safety only as the absence of undesired behavior creates an 
incomplete picture of safety, particularly in highly safe systems in which undesired 
behaviors or outcomes are rare. Examining both desired and undesired behaviors affords 
more opportunities for performance measurement, increasing sensitivity and confidence 
in system safety performance. 
R-2. Leverage existing data to identify strategies and behaviors that build resource 
margins and prevent them from degrading. (F-2) 
 Justification: Evidence of operators’ resilient performance can be identified from many 
existing data sources that were designed to capture events that degrade safety. 
R-3. Develop organization-level strategies that promote recognition and reporting of 
behaviors that support resilient performance. (F-3) 
 Justification: New approaches to safety and risk management that focus on sustaining 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions can help 
organizations recognize the importance of learning from success as well as failure, and 
overcome cultural norms and organizational practices that fail to recognize or reward 
operators’ adaptations to routine disturbances. 
R-4. Develop expert-observer-based data collection tools to capture strategies and 
behaviors that support resilient performance. (F-4) 
 Justification: Expert-observer-based approaches that leverage “threat and error 
management” models may not be sensitive to safety-producing actions taken by operators 
to anticipate and monitor events before threats ever manifest. Integrating approaches to 
identifying behaviors that support sustaining required operations outside of responding to 
or managing threats could increase systematic collection of resilient performance 
indicators. 
R-5. Develop methods to collect and analyze operator-reported strategies and behaviors 
that support resilient performance. (F-5, F-8) 
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 Justification: Operators represent the primary source of data about intentions, goals, 
pressures, and knowledge states that support resilient performance strategies. Methods 
are needed to understand how operators develop and leverage expertise to support 
anticipating, monitoring for, and responding to disturbances and opportunities. A better 
understanding of these processes could create opportunities for developing training, data 
systems, and procedures whereby operators could systematically benefit from others’ 
lived-experiences, not just their own. 
R-6. Develop approaches to expand collection and facilitate analysis of resilient behaviors 
in adverse event reports. (F-6) 
 Justification: First-hand adverse event reports typically include narrative descriptions that 
are potentially rich in describing operators’ intentions, goals, pressures, and knowledge 
states. However, adverse event reporting forms do not emphasize or provide structure for 
reporting of resilient behaviors that may have helped to mitigate or resolve the event. 
Approaches are needed to provide guided assistance to reporters to ensure capture of 
resilient behaviors during adverse event reporting. In addition, manual analysis of these 
reports is slow and labor-intensive. Advances in natural-language processing 
technologies should be leveraged to develop automated tools that could assist in 
identification and analysis of resilient behaviors in adverse event narrative databases. 
R-7. Refine data analytics approaches for exploiting FOQA data based on identified 
resilience strategies. (F-9, F-10) 
 Justification: FOQA data represent a valuable source of objective and quantifiable 
operator performance data. However, few approaches to using these data to identify 
operator resilient performance have been developed or evaluated. Success of these 
approaches will depend on integrating information from FOQA analyses about what, 
when, and where events happened with information from subjective data sources about 
why and how those events happened. 
R-8. Develop a system-level framework for integrating resilient performance data from 
observer-, operator-, and system-based sources. (F-10, F-11, F-12) 
 Justification: While many individual data sources have been identified as providing 
valuable information, the collection of this data is often incidental rather than intentional. 
In some instances, a misalignment between the reasons for data collection and demands 
of data analysis can lead to practical challenges (e.g., between data de-identification and 
integration across data sources). Developing a thorough understanding of work-as-done 
requires a system-level approach for collecting and analyzing the diverse sources of data 
on the real-world resilient behavior of operators. 
5.0 Definition of Terms 
Finding A relevant factual conclusion and/or issue that is within the assessment 
scope and that the team has rigorously based on data from their 
independent analyses, tests, inspections, and/or reviews of technical 
documentation. 
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Margin of maneuver The cushion of potential actions and additional resources that allow the 
system to continue functioning and adapting [Ref. 11]. 
Observation A noteworthy fact, issue, and/or risk, which may not be directly within 
the assessment scope, but could generate a separate issue or concern if 
not addressed. Alternatively, an observation can be a positive 
acknowledgement of a Center/Program/Project/Organization’s 
operational structure, tools, and/or support provided. 
Safety I Safety is defined as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes 
is as low as possible [Ref. 12]. 
Safety II Safety is defined as a system’s ability to succeed under varying 
conditions, so that the number of intended and acceptable outcomes is as 
high as possible [Ref. 12]. 
Recommendation A proposed measurable stakeholder action directly supported by specific 
Finding(s) and/or Observation(s) that will correct or mitigate an 
identified issue or risk. 
Resilience The ability of a system to sustain required operations under both 
expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, 
during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities [Ref. 2]. 
Resilience engineering A paradigm for safety management that focuses on how to help people 
cope with complexity under pressure to achieve success [Ref. 38]. 
Sociotechnical system People and equipment directly dependent on their material means and 
resources for outputs. The core interface consists of relations between a 
nonhuman system and a human system [Ref. 39].  
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Appendix B: Existing Taxonomies of Positive Behaviors  
and Resulting Actions in the Civil Aviation Domain 
Source 1: Positive Taxonomy (ICAO/CAST, 2013) 
 DECISION  
o Avoidance Maneuver  
o Decision to Go‐Around  
o Decision to Land as Precaution  
o Decision to Land on an Unexpected Runway  
o Decision to Reject Takeoff  
o Decision to Return to Departing Point or to Divert  
 EXTERNAL INTERVENTION  
o Aerodrome Intervention/Assistance  
o Air Traffic Intervention/Assistance  
o Assistance of an Instructor/Supervisor  
o Passenger Intervention/Assistance  
o Third Party Intervention/Assistance  
 HARDWARE SAFETY NET   
 PROVIDENCE  
 SOFT SAFETY NET  
o Accurate Usage of Documentation  
o Communications  
o Design Requirements  
o Engine Failure Anticipation  
o Environment Observation  
o Logical Problem Solving  
o Use of Training Instructions/SOPs  
o Visual Detection/Anticipation  
Source 2: “Result” Event Assessment Codes (ASRS, 2018b) 
 GENERAL 
o Evacuated 
o Flight Cancelled / Delayed 
o Maintenance Action 
o None Reported / Taken 
o Physical Injury / Incapacitation 
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o Police / Security Involved 
o Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted 
o Work Refused 
 FLIGHT CREW 
o Became Reoriented 
o Diverted 
o Executed Go Around / Missed Approach 
o Exited Penetrated Airspace 
o FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory 
o FLC Overrode Automation 
o Inflight Shutdown 
o Landed As Precaution 
o Landed in Emergency Condition 
o Overcame Equipment Problem 
o Regained Aircraft Control 
o Rejected Takeoff 
o Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification 
o Returned To Clearance 
o Returned To Departure Airport 
o Returned To Gate 
o Took Evasive Action 
 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
o Issued Advisory / Alert 
o Issued New Clearance 
o Provided Assistance 
o Separated Traffic 
 AIRCRAFT 
o Aircraft Damaged 
o Automation Overrode Flight Crew 
o Equipment Problem Dissipated 
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Appendix C: Potential Data Sets for Analysis 
C.1 Data Sets 
Categories 
Publicly 
Available 
Temporal 
resolution 
Source for Obtaining Data Types Format 
Generating 
Source 
Aircraft 
Flight 
Recorder 
No 1 Hz 
Flight Operational Quality 
Assurance (FOQA) 
Continuous, 
Binary, 
Categorical 
CSV System 
Radar Track 
Surveillance 
With FAA 
Approval 
1 Min 
Traffic Flow Management 
(TFMS) Aircraft Situation 
Display (ASDI) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
XML System 
1/4 Hz 
SWIM Terminal Data 
Distribution System (STDDS) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
CSV System 
1/12 Hz 
SWIM Flight Data Publication 
Service (SFDPS) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
CSV System 
1 Hz 
Airport Surface Detection 
Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
CSV System 
No 
Daily/Per 
flight 
Trajectory Analysis/ 
Report Metrics 
Continuous, 
Binary, 
Categorical 
CSV/ 
XLS 
System 
Weather 
Yes 1 Hr 
Meteorological Terminal 
Aviation Routine (METAR) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
ASCII System 
Yes 6 Hr 
Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts 
(TAFs) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
ASCII System 
Yes 1 Hr 
Integrated Terminal Weather 
System (ITWS) 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
ASCII/ 
XML 
System 
Yes 1 Hr Rapid Refresh (RR) Continuous 
Binary 
(grib) 
System 
Yes 2.5 Mins 
Corridor Integrated Weather 
System (CIWS) 
Continuous 
Binary 
(hdf5) 
System 
Yes 15 Mins 
Convective Weather Avoidance 
Model (CWAM) 
Continuous, 
Binary 
Binary 
(hdf5) 
System 
Yes 2 Hrs 
Collaborative Convective 
Forecast Product (CCFP) 
Continuous, 
Binary 
ASCII System 
Narratives 
Yes As reported 
Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS) 
Textual ASCII Operator 
No As reported 
Aviation Safety Action Program 
(ASAP) 
Textual ASCII Operator 
No 
Research 
Studies  
Airlines/Controllers Interviews 
Textual, 
Categorical  
ASCII Operator 
FAA 
Procedures/ 
Notices 
Yes 56 Days 
SID/STAR Procedures (Coded 
Instrument Flight 
Procedures)/Airnav.com 
Continuous, 
Categorical 
ASCII/ 
PDF 
System 
Yes As reported Notice To Airmen (NOTAM) 
Textual, 
Categorical 
ASCII/ 
XML 
System 
Planning 
Yes 
Per flight/as 
amended 
Flight Plans Textual ASCII System 
No Per flight Flight Schedules Textual ASCII System 
Voice Yes Continuous 
Live ATC, FAA Voice Archive 
(last 45 days) 
Audio MP3 System 
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Traffic 
Statistics 
Yes 15 mins 
Aviation System Performance 
Metrics (ASPM) 
Continuous, 
Binary, 
Categorical 
CSV System 
Training 
No >1Hz Flight Simulators  
Continuous, 
Binary, 
Categorical, 
Video 
CSV, 
MOV 
System 
No Per flight Flight Instructor (LOFT) 
Textual, 
Categorical 
ASCII Observer 
Audits No Limited Audit 
Line Operations Safety Audits 
(LOSA) 
Textual ASCII Observer 
Maintenance No 
Daily/ 
Per flight 
Airlines, Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) 
Textual, 
Categorical 
ASCII Operator 
C.2 Descriptions and Sources for Data Categories 
Aircraft Flight Recorder 
Description: 
 Onboard aircraft flight data recorder. Typically referred to as FOQA data. Continuously 
records the following categories: aircraft position/orientation (latitude/longitude, altitude, 
speed, pitch, roll, yaw, accelerations, etc.), control surface positions (ailerons, elevators, 
flaps, speed brakes, etc.), auto pilot modes (lateral, vertical, auto throttle modes), and 
engine parameters (N1/N2 rotor speeds, oil pressure/temp, etc.), environmental (temp, 
winds).  
Sources: 
 Airlines 
 ASIAS 
Radar Track Surveillance 
Description: 
 4-D Positional information lat/lon/alt/time. Ground speed is derived from positional 
updates. Facilities monitored include Center, Terminal Radar Approach Control, airport 
ground operations. Gate-to-gate trajectories spanning multiple facilities can be stitched 
together post flight.  
 Additional metrics are also computed post flight analysis and are available as reports. 
These include: go-arounds, deviations, turn to final characteristics, en-route weather 
avoidance.  
Sources: 
 FAA System Wide Information Management (SWIM) feed, reports radar hits for flights 
throughout the NAS. These include:  
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o Traffic Flow Management (TFMS) which provides Aircraft Situation Display 
(ASDI) data.  
o SWIM Terminal Data Distribution System (STDDS),  
o SWIM Flight Data Publication Service (SFDPS),  
o Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model-X (ASDE-X).  
o Post flight gate-to-gate stitched trajectories are available through NASA Sherlock 
data warehouse, Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System (PDARS), 
Threaded Track.  
 Sources for report metrics include: NASA Sherlock, PDARS reports, Threaded Track key 
performance indicators.  
Weather 
Description: 
 Reports of surface measurements at airports, wind direction, visibility, weather type (fog, 
snow, rain, thunderstorms, etc.), humidity, temperature, etc.  
 Forecasted weather for the next 24-30 Hrs for a 5 NM radius, centered around airports. 
Forecasts include wind direction, visibility, cloud cover and ceiling, probability of fog, 
snow, rain, thunderstorms, etc.).  
 Current weather information and predictions using graphical and textual formats. 
Information includes wind shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and lightning 
information, and terminal area winds aloft. Anticipated weather conditions are provided 
as 60-minute forecasts. /cite{ https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/technology/itws/} 
 Estimated winds aloft, temperature, and humidity for 3-d grid across US  
 Convective weather measurements 2-d grid across US: Vertical Integrated Liquid, Echo 
Tops, water phase (frozen, liquid, mixed). 
 Tactical convective weather cell polygons for en-route operations. 
 Forecast strategic large weather cell polygons for en-route operations.  
Sources: 
 METAR (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)). 
 Terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) (NOAA).  
 Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS). Product of SWIM feed.  
 Rapid Refresh (NOAA). 
 Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS). Product of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) Lincoln Labs. 
 Convective Weather Avoidance Model (CWAM). Product of MIT Lincoln Labs. 
 Collaborative Convective Forecast Product (CCFP). Product of MIT Lincoln Labs. 
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Narratives 
Description: 
 Voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident/situation narrative reports from pilots, 
controllers.  
 Subject Matter Expert interviews. Directed questions for specific study. 
Sources: 
 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). NASA managed.  
 Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). Airlines, ASIAS.  
 Various research interviews. NASA initiated.  
FAA Procedures/Notices 
Description: 
 Procedural information containing navigational sequence of waypoints, altitude, speed 
requirements for departure/arrival routes.  
 Regularly published notices that contains information regarding special use airspace, 
equipment outages, runway closures, etc. 
Sources: 
 Coded Flight Instrument Procedures (CIFP). http://airnav.com, Jeppesen. 
 Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), over SWIM feed, https://pilotweb.nas.faa.gov. 
Planning 
Description: 
 Filed flight route that describes a sequence of waypoints and procedures used to navigate 
flight from origin to planned destination. This includes airport, waypoints, SID, STARs, 
and airways. Amendments as route is adjusted in flight are also recorded.  
 Dispatcher flight scheduling may have historical and future planned flights from origin to 
destination. Tactical information regarding traffic and weather.  
Sources: 
 Airlines. 
Voice 
Description: 
 Voice communications between ATC and pilots and includes assigned routes, 
altitude/speed clearances, holding, and traffic advisories. Contains pilot and controller 
intent with highly domain specific lexicon that is usually succinct.  
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Sources: 
 Live ATC, FAA Voice Archive. 
Traffic Statistics 
Description: 
 Statistics on airport runway configuration, arrivals/departure rates, taxi delay times, 
ceiling/visibility, temp, winds, runway configuration across airports. 
Sources: 
 Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM) 
 Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://www.bts.gov/topics/airlines-and-airports-0 
Training 
Description: 
 Simulations of flights and/or interactions with ATC in a controlled environment. Studies 
can control system behavior (weather, traffic, automation, etc.), and measure variable 
human response.  
 Instructor notes after flight training based on experience during training exercise.  
Sources: 
 Flight simulators Airlines, NASA, Boeing, Airbus. 
 Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT), Airlines, 3rd party training.  
Audits 
Description: 
 Assessment notes of pilot activity during flight. Looking for positive and negative aspects 
of the operation.  
Sources: 
 Contracted services (e.g., The LOSA Collaborative) 
Maintenance 
Description: 
 Records on item/systems that were repaired/replaced. Scheduled vs unscheduled 
maintenance timelines.  
Sources: 
 Airlines, OEMs.  
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Appendix D: Pilot and Controller Interview Protocol 
Initial Question: Unplanned and unexpected events happen routinely during operations in the 
NAS. We are interested in how [pilots/controllers] make adjustments before, during and after 
these unplanned or unexpected events in order to maintain safe operations. Can you tell me about 
a specific unplanned or unexpected event that you have experienced in the course of routine 
operations? 
Probe 1 (Anticipate):  
 Were there things you were aware of at the start of your [flight/shift] that you thought 
increased the likelihood that this event might occur during that [flight/shift]? 
 How did you know that this event might occur? 
 How else might you have been able to anticipate that this event would occur? 
Probe 2 (Monitor):  
 Were there things that you experienced during that [flight/shift] that you thought 
increased the likelihood that this event might occur? 
 What signaled/indicated to you that this event was about to occur, was occurring, or had 
occurred? 
 How did you know what indicators of this event to look for during your [flight/shift]?  
 What other indicators could have alerted you to this event? 
Probe 3 (Respond):  
 How did you respond to this event? 
 How did you know what to do in response to this event? 
 If you had not already known what to do to respond to this event, how would you have 
figured out what to do? 
Probe 4 (Learn):  
 What did you learn from this event? 
 How did what you learned impact the remainder of your [flight/shift] or that operation? 
 How did what you learned impact how you prepare for future [flights/shifts] or 
operations? 
 Have you shared what you learned with others in your organization? How did you do 
that? 
 In general, what practices are in place in your organization for [pilots/controllers] to share 
lessons learned? 
Probe 5 (Wrap-up):  
 Is there anything further you’d like for us to know about this event that we haven’t 
already discussed? 
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Appendix E: Controller Questionnaire 
NASA is investigating development of continuous real-time monitoring, real-time anomaly and 
precursor identification tools to help identify, predict, and help prevent emergent risks and 
hazards to the air traffic system. We are interested in understanding the contribution that human 
operators, such as air traffic controllers, have on the safety of the air traffic system.  
Traditional approaches to safety management focus on preventing the things that can go wrong, 
using techniques such as accident and incident analysis. Another approach to safety management 
is emergent risk mitigation by analyzing the things that go right. This NASA project aims to find 
and document “safety successes” and how people anticipate, monitor for, response to, and learn 
from unexpected events to exhibit successful, resilient performance.  
Resilience can be defined as “the intrinsic ability to adjust functioning prior to, during, or 
following changes and disturbances, so that required operations can be sustained under both 
expected and unexpected conditions.”   
1. How Often Do You Exhibit Resilience to Perform the Job as Air Traffic Controller? 
 
2. In your job as Air Traffic Controller, how often do you exhibit the following behaviors? 
a) Finding goal-directed and proactive solutions that require trading for conflicting goals 
such as capacity, efficiency, and costs  
 
b) Anticipating needs for planning and coordination 
 
c) Using judgment for improvisation of standard operating procedures for safety/efficiency/ 
capacity purposes 
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d) Inventing work-around procedures and techniques that work better for actual practice 
 
e) Applying flexibility to increase safety buffers and defensive controlling for buffering 
capacity, margins, and added safety tolerance 
 
f) Providing team support and adaptive capacity as required 
 
g) Utilizing resources as required, such as consulting written/printed documentation 
(manuals, procedures) or electronic information (e.g., AIP online, route charts for 
alternative waypoints) 
 
h) Developing strategies for managing workload 
 
3. How often would you estimate the traffic management decisions you make are not 
specified as policies and procedures by JO 7110.65 or that of the specific facility (for 
example, procedural letters of agreement).  
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How many of these would you categorize as “resilient” decisions? ______________ % of 
decisions 
 
4. Imagine a new Air Traffic Management system was introduced at the facility where you 
work/have worked. Assume that you were told that the system was designed to exactly 
follow the policies and procedures defined by JO 7110.65 and that of the specific facility 
(for example, procedural letters of agreement). You were also told that you continue to 
have responsibility but that your job is to now to monitor the system and correct and/or 
over-ride any decisions made by the system. You may not turn the system off.  
Please estimate the % of air traffic control decisions the system would make correctly:  
a. During peak traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______   
b. During nominal traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______ 
c. During low traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______ 
Please estimate the % of air traffic control decisions the system would make safely:  
a. During peak traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______   
b. During nominal traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______ 
c. During low traffic volume % of decisions made correctly _______ 
5. The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) provides the following database entry 
fields for Air Traffic Control:  
Provided Assistance 
Issued Advisory/Alert 
Issued New Clearance 
Separated Traffic 
We are interested in what additional fields should be added/included in the ASRS system that 
would characterize positive actions and/or outcomes performed by or as a result of Air 
Traffic Control. Please provide additional result-oriented action phrases that may describe an 
action or event that would represent a positive outcome.  
6. What do you consider the most significant emergent risk to resilience today for Air 
Traffic Management? Why? 
7. In 20 years, how do you think ATM will be different than it is today?  
8. What do you think will be the most significant risk to resilience for Air Traffic 
Management? Why? 
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